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Assessing Financial Vulnerability: An Early Warning System for Emerging Markets: 
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 Morris Goldstein, Graciela L. Kaminsky, and Carmen M. Reinhart 
(Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Purpose and motivation 
This study analyzes and provides empirical tests of early warning indicators of banking 
and currency crises in emerging economies.  The aim is to identify key empirical regularities in 
the run-up to banking and currency crises that would enable officials and private market 
participants to recognize vulnerability to financial crises at an earlier stage.  This, in turn, should 
make it easier to motivate the corrective policy actions that would prevent such crises from 
actually taking place.  Interest in identifying early warning indicators of financial crises has 
soared of late, stoked primarily by two factors.   
First, there is increasing recognition that banking and currency crises can be extremely 
costly to the countries in which they originate; in addition, these crises often spillover via a 
variety of international channels to increase the vulnerability of other countries to financial crisis. 
According to the IMF's tally, there have been over sixty five developing-country episodes 
during the 1980-95 period when the banking system's capital was completely or nearly 
exhausted;1  the public-sector bail-out costs of resolving banking crises in developing countries 
during this period has been estimated at around $250 billion.2  In at least a dozen of these 
banking crises, the public-sector resolution costs amounted to 10 percent or more of the country's 
                     
     
1
  See Lindgren et al (1997).  Other identifications of banking crises over this period can be found in Caprio 
and Klingebiel (1996), Dimerguc-Kunt and Detraigche (1998), Eichengreen and Rose (1998), Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1996), and the IMF (1998c). 
     
2
  See Honohan (1997). 
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GDP.3   In the latest additions to the list of severe banking crises, the cost of bank 
recapitalization for the countries most affected in the ongoing Asian financial crisis is expected 
to be huge--on the order of 30 percent of GDP for both Thailand and South Korea and 20 percent 
of GDP for Indonesia and Malaysia.4  
In addition to the enormous fiscal costs, banking crises exacerbate declines in economic 
activity, prevent precious national saving from flowing to its most productive use, limit the room 
for maneuver in the conduct of domestic monetary policy, and increase the chances of 
undergoing a currency crisis as well.5  Illustrative of the magnitude of output losses, an IMF 
(1998c) study, drawing on a sample of 31 developing countries, reports that it typically takes 
almost three years for output growth to return to trend after the outbreak of a banking crisis and 
that the cumulative output loss averaged 12 percent.6  Probably the main reason why the 
Mexican authorities did not make more aggressive use of interest rate policy after the Colosio 
assassination is that bad loan problems in the banking system had by then already become 
serious and they were worried that recourse to higher interest rates would push Mexican banks 
over the edge; yet failure to increase domestic interest rates in the face of increasing concern on 
the part of international investors contributed to a rapid decline in international reserves and 
helped to transform a banking problem into a currency and debt crisis.7  Drawing on a broader 
sample of banking and currency crises in emerging economies, there is evidence that banking 
                     
     
3
  See Goldstein (1997) for a list of these severe banking crises.  For comparison, the public-sector tab for 
the U.S. saving and loan crisis is typically estimated at about 2-3 percent of U.S. GDP.   
     
4
  See Eschweiler (1998b). 
     
5  See Lindgren et al (1996) and Goldstein and Turner (1996).   
     
6
  In Chapter 7, we present our own estimates of how long it takes growth rates of real output to recover 
after banking and/or currency crises. 
     
7
  See Calvo and Goldstein (1996). 
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crises typically precede currency crises.8   
Although the contagion of financial disturbances usually runs from large countries to 
smaller ones, the Asian financial crisis has shown that severe financial-sector difficulties in even 
a relatively small economy (namely Thailand) can have wide ranging spillover effects if it acts as 
a "wake up call" for investors to reassess country risk and if a set of other economies have 
vulnerabilities similar to those in the economy first affected.9 
The costs of currency crises have likewise been shown to be significant.  Mexico's peso 
crisis was accompanied in 1995 by a decline in real GDP of 6 percent--its deepest recession in 
sixty years.  During the ERM crises of the fall of 1992 and summer of 1993, on the order of $150 
billion was spent on official exchange market intervention in a fruitless effort to stave off the 
forced devaluation and/or floating of ERM currencies.  In emerging Asia, consensus forecasts for 
1998 growth issued just prior to the crisis (that is, in May/June 1997) generally stood in the 6-8 
percent range.  As indicated in Table 1.1, these forecasts have now been subject to 
unprecedented downward revisions in the midst of the currency, banking, and debt crises 
enveloping these economies.  The IMF (1998c) estimates that emerging economies suffer, on 
average, an 8 percent cumulative loss in real output (relative to trend) during a severe currency 
crisis.  And like banking crises, currency crises too seem to exhibit contagious behavior.  One 
recent study found that a currency crisis elsewhere in the world increases the probability of a 
speculative attack by an economically and statistically significant amount even after controlling 
                     
     
8
  See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) and IMF (1998).  In Chapter ?, we provide further evidence that the 
presence of a banking crises is one of the better leading indicators of a currency crises in emerging economies. 
     
9
  See Calvo and Reinhart (1996) and Goldstein (1998a).  Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998b) provide an 
analysis of contagion in the Asian crisis that stresses the financial links among these countries--including the sudden 
withdrawal of funds by a common commercial bank lender or mutual fund investor. 
 4
for economic and political fundamentals in the country concerned.10  
Table 1.1.  Real GDP growth forecasts 
 
 
Country 
 
    1996 
 
    1997e 
 
    1998: as of 
May 1997 
 
   1998: as of 
December 
1998 
 
Change in 
1998 forecast 
 
Indonesia 
 
     7.8 
 
     5.6 
 
      7.5 
 
     -15.3 
 
     -22.8 
 
Thailand 
 
     6.4 
 
     0.4 
 
      7.0 
 
       -8.0 
 
    -15.0 
 
South 
Korea 
 
     7.1 
 
     5.8 
 
      6.3 
 
       -7.0 
 
     -13.3 
 
Malaysia 
 
     8.6 
 
     7.4 
 
      7.9 
 
        -7.5 
 
     -15.4 
 
Philippines 
 
     5.7 
 
     5.1 
 
      6.4 
 
         0.2 
 
        -6.2 
 
Hong Kong 
 
    4.9 
 
     5.4 
 
      5.5 
 
       - 5.0 
 
      -10.5 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 
 
The more costly it is to clean up after a financial crisis has already occurred, the greater 
the returns to designing a well-functioning early-warning system. 
The second reason for the increased interest in early warning indicators of financial 
crises is that there is accumulating evidence that two of the most closely watched “market 
indicators” of default and currency risks--namely, interest rate spreads and changes in credit 
ratings--frequently do not provide much advance warning of currency and banking crises. 11 
                     
     
10
  Eichengreen et al (1996); see also Calvo and Reinhart (1996) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998b). 
     
11
 This issue is explored in some detail in Chapter 4. 
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Empirical studies of the 1992-93 ERM crisis have typically concluded that market 
measures of currency risk did not point to the specter of significant devaluations of the weaker 
ERM currencies before the fact.12  In the run-up to the Mexican crisis, market signals were again 
muted or inconsistent.  More specifically, measures of default risk on tesobonos (dollar indexed, 
Mexican government securities) jumped up sharply in April 1994 (after the Colosio 
assassination) but stayed roughly constant between then and the outbreak of the crisis.13  From 
April 1994 on, market measures of currency depreciation on the peso usually were beyond the 
government's announced rate; nevertheless, this measure of currency risk fluctuated markedly 
and the gap between market expectations and the official rate was widest in summer of 1994 
when the attack came with most ferocity only in late December.14  
The preliminary evidence now available suggests that the performance of interest spreads 
and credit ratings was likewise disappointing in the run-up to the Asian financial crisis.  
Examining interest rate spreads on three-month offshore securities, one study found that these 
spreads gave no warning of impending difficulties (i.e., were either flat or declining) for 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines and produced only intermittent signals for Thailand.15  
A recent analysis of spreads using local interest rates for South Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia 
found similarly little indicator of growing crisis vulnerability.16  
                     
     
12
  See Rose and Svensson (1994). 
     
13
  See Calvo and Goldstein (1996) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). 
     
14
  See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), Leiderman and Thorne (1996), and Rosenberg (1998). 
     
15
  Eschweiler (1997). 
     
16
  See Rosenberg (1998). 
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Sovereign credit ratings (on long-term, foreign-currency debt) issued by the two largest 
international ratings firms were even less prescient in the Asian crisis.17  As shown in Table 1.2, 
there were almost no downgrades for the most severely affected countries in the eighteen month 
run-up to the crisis.  As the Economist (1997, p. 68) put it, "... in country after country, it has 
often been the case of too little, too late."  Looking at a larger sample of cases, a recent OECD 
study was unable to find consistent support for the proposition that sovereign credit ratings act 
more like a leading than a lagging indicator of market prices (i.e., of interest rate spreads).18 
                     
     
17  See Radelet and Sachs (1998), World Bank (1998), and Goldstein (1998c).  In a recent report, Moody's 
(1998) argues that its rating record in the East Asian crisis was better than it appears at first sight from ratings 
changes alone.  More specifically, the report argues, inter alia,  that Moody's went into the crisis with lower ratings 
for the crisis countries than the other major ratings agencies (i.e., Standard & Poors and Fitch-IBCA), that it took 
ratings actions before its main competitors, that its low bank financial strength ratings identified many of the banks 
that subsequently experienced stress in the crisis countries, that changes in sovereign credit ratings led to a widening 
of yield spreads in the crisis countries, and that one should examine the sovereign research reports -- not just the 
ratings -- in looking for early warning signals.  At the same time, the report acknowledges that the firm is studying 
several potential enhancements to their analytical methodology to help improve the predictive power of their 
sovereign ratings. 
     
18
  Larrain, Reisen, and von Maltzan (1997). 
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Table 1.2: Performance of Ratings Agencies Prior to Asian Crisis 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s Long Term Debt Ratings 1996-1997 
 
 
 
 
 
      Jan. 15, 1996 
 
      Dec. 2, 1996 
 
         Jun 24, 1997 
 
      Dec. 12, 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
Rating 
 
Outlook 
 
Rating  
 
Outlook 
 
Rating 
 
Outlook 
 
Rating 
 
Outlook 
 
MOODY’S   Foreign Currency Debt 
 
Indonesia 
 
 
 
Baa3 
 
 
 
Baa3 
 
 
 
Baa3 
 
 
 
Baa3 
 
 
 
Malaysia 
 
 
 
A1 
 
 
 
A1 
 
 
 
A1 
 
 
 
A1 
 
 
 
Mexico 
 
 
 
Ba2 
 
 
 
Ba2 
 
 
 
Ba2 
 
 
 
Ba2 
 
 
 
Philippines 
 
 
 
Ba2 
 
 
 
Ba2 
 
 
 
Ba2 
 
 
 
Ba2 
 
 
 
South 
Korea 
 
 
 
A1 
 
 
 
A1 
 
stable 
 
 
 
 
 
Baa2 
 
negative 
 
Thailand 
 
 
 
A2 
 
 
 
A2 
 
 
 
A2 
 
 
 
Baa1 
 
negative 
 
STANDARD AND POOR’S 
 
     October 1997 
 
Indonesia 
 
Foreign Currency 
Debt 
 
BBB 
 
stable 
 
BBB 
 
stable 
 
BBB 
 
stable 
 
BBB 
 
negative 
 
 
 
Domestic Currency 
Debt 
 
 
 
 
 
A+ 
 
 
 
A+ 
 
 
 
A- 
 
negative 
 
Malaysia 
 
Foreign Currency 
Debt 
 
A+ 
 
stable 
 
A+ 
 
stable 
 
A+ 
 
positive 
 
A+ 
 
negative 
 
 
 
Domestic Currency 
Debt 
 
AA+ 
 
 
 
AA+ 
 
 
 
AA+ 
 
 
 
AA+ 
 
negative 
 
Philippines 
 
Foreign Currency 
Debt 
 
BB 
 
positive 
 
BB 
 
positive 
 
BB+ 
 
positive 
 
BB+ 
 
stable 
 
 
 
Domestic Currency 
Debt 
 
BBB+ 
 
 
 
BBB+ 
 
 
 
A- 
 
 
 
A- 
 
stable 
 
South 
Korea 
 
Foreign Currency 
Debt 
 
AA- 
 
stable 
 
AA- 
 
stable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Domestic Currency 
Debt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thailand 
 
Foreign Currency 
Debt 
 
A 
 
stable 
 
A 
 
stable 
 
A 
 
stable 
 
BBB 
 
negative 
 
 
 
Domestic Currency 
Debt 
 
 
 
 
 
AA 
 
 
 
AA 
 
 
 
A 
 
negative 
 
Mexico 
 
Foreign Currency 
Debt 
 
BB 
 
negative 
 
BB 
 
 
 
 
BB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Domestic Currency 
Debt 
 
BBB+ 
 
 
 
BBB+ 
 
stable 
 
BBB+ 
 
positive 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Rating Systems (from highest to lowest) 
         Moody’s :  Aaa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3, A1, A2, A3, Baa1, Baa2, Baa3, Ba1, Ba2, Ba3 
         S&P’s : AAA, AA+, AA, AA-, A+, A, A-, BBB+, BBB, BBB-, BB+, BB, BB- 
Source: Radelet and Sachs (1998)  
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There are of course several reasons why interest rate spreads or changes in sovereign 
credit ratings may not anticipate financial crises well.  For one thing, market participants may not 
have timely, accurate, and comprehensive information on the borrower's creditworthiness.  
Several recent examples underscore the point.19 Thailand's commitments in the forward 
exchange market and South Korea's lending of international reserves to commercial banks meant 
that official figures on gross international reserves gave a misleading (i.e., overoptimistic) view 
of each country's net usable reserves.  Similarly, external foreign-currency denominated debt of 
Indonesian corporations, along with non-performing bank loans in South Korea, Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia turned out to be considerably larger than pre-crisis published official 
data suggested.20  Ceteris paribus, if the true size of liquid assets and liabilities were known at an 
earlier stage, interest rate spreads would have been higher and credit ratings would have been 
lower than actually observed prior to the Asian crisis; this in turn may well have moderated the 
sharp change in market sentiment that was associated with the "news" of lower than expected net 
worth of Asian debtors.  
                     
     
19
  For further elaboration, see Goldstein (1998a), Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998), and BIS (1998). 
     
20
  Along the same lines, Garber (1997) shows that in the run-up to the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-95, off-
balance sheet derivative positions on the part of Mexican banks meant that their unhedged foreign-currency 
exposure was much larger than suggested by either published data or standard prudential ratios. 
 9
The other reason why market prices may not signal impending crises is that there are 
often widely and strongly-held expectations of a bail-out of a troubled borrower by the official 
sector -- be it national or international.  In such cases, interest rate spreads will reflect the 
creditworthiness of the guarantor -- not that of the borrower.  Again, it is not difficult to find 
recent examples where such expectations could well have impaired market signals.  In Asian 
emerging economies, several authors have argued that implicit and explicit guarantees of the 
liabilities of financial institutions were important in motivating the large net private capital 
inflows into the region in the 1990s, while others have emphasized that the disciplined fiscal 
positions of these countries may have convinced investors that should banks and finance 
companies experience strains, governments would have the resources to honor their guarantees.21  
In the case of the Mexican peso crisis, it has similarly been argued that after agreeing NAFTA, it 
would have been very costly for the United States to stand by while Mexico either devalued the 
peso or defaulted on its external obligations and that expectations of a U.S. bail-out blunted the 
operation of early-warning signals.22  And looking eastward, investments in Russian and 
Ukrainian government securities have in recent years sometimes been known on Wall Street as 
"the moral hazard play" -- reflecting the expectation that geopolitical factors and security 
concerns would, when push came to shove, lead to a bail-out of troubled borrowers.  Suffice to 
say that the size and frequency of IMF-led international financial rescue packages -- including 
commitments of nearly $50 billion for Mexico in 1994-95, over $120 billion for Thailand, 
                     
     
21
  See Krugman (1998), Dooley (1997), and Calomiris (1997) on the role of expected national and 
international bailouts in motivating capital flows and/or banking crises.  Claessens and Glaessner (1997) highlight 
the link between fiscal positions and the wherewithal to honor explicit and implicit guarantees in the financial 
sector.  Goldstein (1998a) offers a set of proposals on how the "moral hazard" associated with international financial 
rescue packages might be reduced.  
     
22
  See Leiderman and Thorne (1996) and Calvo and Goldstein (1996). 
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Indonesia, and South Korea in 1997-98, and over $25 billion for Russia and Ukraine in 1998 -- 
illustrate that market expectations of official bail-outs cannot be dismissed lightly. 
If interest rate spreads and sovereign credit ratings only blow the whistle on financial 
crises once in a while, increased interest attaches to the question of whether there are other early-
warning indicators that history suggests would do a better job, and if so, what are they?  This is 
one of the key questions we address in this study. 
 
Methodology and organization 
 Our approach to identifying early warning indicators of financial crises in emerging 
economies reflects a number of decisions about the appropriate methodology for conducting such 
an empirical exercise.  Key elements of our thinking can be summarized in the following seven 
guidelines.  
(i)  If one hopes to find a systematic pattern in the origin of financial crises, one needs to 
look beyond the last prominent  crisis (or group of crises) to a larger sample; otherwise there is a 
risk either that there will be too many potential explanations to discriminate between important 
and less important factors, or that generalizations and lessons will be drawn that do not 
necessarily apply across a wider body of experience.  In our work, we try to guard against these 
risks by looking at a sample of 87 currency crises and 29 banking crises that occurred in a 
sample of 25 emerging economies and smaller industrial countries over the 1970-95 period.  
Currency crises are defined as extreme values (three standard deviations or more above the 
mean) of an index of exchange market pressure.  This index is a weighted average of percentage 
changes in the exchange rate and percentage changes in gross international reserves; it captures 
the notion that currency crises are marked by "large" currency depreciations and/or "large" 
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declines in international reserves.23  Banking crises are defined as events characterized by a 
combination of bank runs, mergers, bank closures, and large-scale government 
intervention/assistance to a group of financial institutions.24  
Several examples help to illustrate the point.  Consider the last two major financial crises 
of the 1990s:  the 1994-95 Mexican peso crisis and the ongoing Asian financial crisis.  Was the 
peso crisis primarily driven by Mexico's large current-account deficit (equal to almost 8 percent 
of its GDP in 1994), or by the overvaluation of the peso's real exchange rate, or by the maturity 
and composition of Mexico's external borrowing (too short term and too dependent on portfolio 
flows), or by the uses to which that foreign borrowing was put (too much for consumption and 
not enough for investment), or by the already weakened state of the banking system (the share of 
non-performing loans doubled between mid-1990 and mid-1994), or by bad luck (in the form of 
unfortunate domestic political developments and an upward turn in the international interest rate 
cycle), or by failure to correct fast enough earlier slippages in monetary and fiscal policies in the 
face of market nervousness, or by a growing imbalance between the stock of liquid foreign-
currency denominated liabilities and the stock of international reserves, or by an expectation on 
the part of Mexico's creditors that the United States government would step in to bail-out holders 
                     
     
23
  Since it looks at both changes in nominal exchange rates and changes in international reserves, such an 
index of exchange market pressure can accommodate both flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes.  Because 
countries sometimes respond to exchange market pressure by altering domestic interest rates, a comprehensive index 
would also include market interest rates as a third component.  Because many of the countries in our sample did not 
maintain market-determined interest rates for at least some of the sample period, we had to be content with including 
only exchange rates and international reserves in the index of exchange market pressure. 
     
24
  One advantage of this definition of banking crises is that crises can be identified within a relatively brief 
period from their occurrence; in contrast, definitions of banking crises that rely on reaching a threshold share of non-
performing loans or of government resolution costs as a share of GDP imply a longer time lag since the data on 
which such definitions depend appear with relatively long publication lags.  In any case, as we show in Chapter 2, 
there is considerable overlap in the dating of banking crises across alternative definitions.  
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of tesobonos?25  Analogously, was the Asian financial crisis due to the credit boom  experienced 
by the ASEAN-4 economies (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines), or by a 
concentration of credit to real estate and equities, or by large maturity and currency mismatches 
in the composition of external borrowing, or by easy global liquidity conditions, or by capital-
account liberalization cum weak financial-sector supervision, or by relatively large current-
account deficits and real exchange rate overvaluations in the run-up to the crisis, or by a 
deteriorating quality of investment, or by increasing competition from China, or by global 
overproduction in certain industries important to the crisis countries, or by contagion from 
Thailand?26  Here, there are simply too many likely suspects to draw generalizations from two 
episodes --even if they are important episodes.  To tell, for example, whether overvalued 
exchange rates are a better leading indicator of currency crises than are say current-account 
deficits, we need to run a horse race across a larger number of currency crises. 
Equally but operating in the opposite direction, there is a risk of "jumping the gun" by 
concluding that one factor is a key leading indicator in most crises just because it has been 
present in a relatively small set of prominent crises.  An example is "credit booms" (i.e., 
expansions of bank credit that are large relative to the growth of the economy) which have been 
shown to be a precursor of banking crises in Japan, in several Scandinavian countries, and in 
Latin America.27  Yet when we compare credit booms as a leading indicator of banking crises to 
other indicators across a larger group of emerging economies and smaller industrial countries, we 
                     
     
25
  See Leiderman and Thorne (1996) and Calvo and Goldstein (1996) for an analysis of the Mexican 
crisis. 
     
26  These alternative explanations of the Asian crisis are discussed in BIS (1998), Corsetti et al (1997), 
Goldstein (1998a), Radelet and Sachs (1998), IMF (1997), and World Bank (1998).  
     
27  See Gavin and Hausman (1996). 
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find that credit booms are outperformed by a variety of other indicators.  Put in other words, 
credit booms have been a very good leading indicator in some prominent (large-country) banking 
crises but are not, on average, the best leading indicator in emerging economies more generally.  
Again, it is helpful to have recourse to a larger sample of crises to sort out competing 
hypotheses. 
(ii)  A second guideline in this study is to pay as much attention to banking crises as to 
currency crises.  To this point, most of the existing literature on leading indicators of financial 
crises relates exclusively to currency crises.28  Yet the costs of banking crises in developing 
countries appear to be greater than those of currency crises, banking crises appear to be one of 
the more important factors generating currency crises, and the determinants and leading 
indicators of banking crises should be amenable to same type of quantitative analysis as for 
currency crises.29  In this study, we analyze banking and currency crises separately, as well as 
exploring the interactions among them.  As it turns out, several of the early warning indicators 
that show the best performance for currency crises also work well in anticipating banking crises; 
at the same time, there are enough differences in the early warning process and in the aftermath 
of crises as between currency and banking crises to justify treating each in its own right. 
                     
     
28
  See Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) for a review of this literature.  Among the relatively few 
studies that include or concentrate on banking crises in emerging economies, we would highlight Caprio and 
Klingebiel (1996a, 1996b), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997), Eichengreen and Rose (1997), Furnam and 
Stiglitz (1998), Honohan (1996), Gavin and Hausman (1996), Goldstein (1997), Goldstein and Turner (1996), 
Kaminsky (1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998a, 1998b), Rojas-Suarez (1998), Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod 
(1996), Sheng (1996), and Sundararijan and Balino (1991).    
     
29  Both Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998a) and the IMF (1998c) conclude that the output costs of banking 
crises in emerging economies typically exceed those for currency crises and that these costs are greater still during 
what Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) call "twin crises" (that is, episodes when the country is undergoing 
simultaneously a banking and currency crisis).  We provide further empirical evidence on this issue in Chapter 7. 
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(iii)  A third feature of our approach -- and one that differentiates our work from that of 
many other researchers -- is that we employ monthly data to analyze banking crises as well as 
currency crises.30   Use of monthly (as opposed to annual data) involves a trade-off.  On the 
minus side, because monthly data on the requisite variables for a long time period (1970-98) are 
available for a smaller number of countries than would be the case for annual data, the decision 
to go with higher frequency data results in a smaller sample of countries (i.e., 25 countries versus 
more than 100 countries with annual data).  The indicators, as well as its periodicity, and the 
transformation used are reported in Table 1.3 while the country coverage and sample period are 
presented in Table 1.4.   
                     
     
30
  For example, the studies of banking crises in emerging markets by Caprio and Klingebiel (1996a, 
1996b), Goldstein and Turner (1996), Honohan (1996), and Sundararajan and Balino (1991) are primarily 
qualitative, while the studies by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997), Eichengreen and Rose (1998), and the IMF 
(1998c) use annual data for their quantitative investigation of the determinants of banking crises. 
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Table 1.3. Selected leading indicators of banking and currency crises 
 
 
INDICATOR 
 
TRANSFORMATION 
 
DATA FREQUENCY 
 
REAL OUTPUT 
 
12 month growth rate 
 
Monthly 
 
EQUITY PRICES 
 
12 month growth rate 
 
Monthly 
 
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 
 
12 month growth rate 
 
Monthly 
 
DOMESTIC/FOREIGN REAL INTEREST  RATE 
DIFFERENTIAL 
 
Level 
 
Monthly 
 
EXCESS REAL M1 BALANCES 
 
Level 
 
Monthly 
 
M2/INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 
 
12 month growth rate 
 
Monthly 
 
BANK DEPOSITS 
 
12 month growth rate 
 
Monthly 
 
M2 MULTIPLIER 
 
12 month growth rate 
 
Monthly 
 
DOMESTIC CREDIT/GDP 
 
12 month growth rate 
 
Monthly 
 
REAL INTEREST RATE ON DEPOSITS 
 
Level 
 
Monthly 
 
LENDING ITEREST RATE/DEPOSIT INTEREST RATE 
 
Level 
 
Monthly 
 
REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
 
Deviation from trend 
 
Monthly 
 
EXPORTS 
 
12 month growth rate 
 
Monthly 
 
IMPORTS 
 
12 month growth rate 
 
Monthly 
 
TERMS OF TRADE 
 
12 month growth rate 
 
Monthly 
 
MOODY’S SOVEREIGN CREDIT RATINGS 
 
1 month change 
 
Monthly 
 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR SOVEREIGN CREDIT 
RATINGS 
 
Semi annual change  
 
Semi annual 
 
GENERAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION 
 
Annual growth rate 
 
Annual 
 
OVERALL BUDGET DEFICIT/GDP 
 
Level 
 
Annual 
 
NET CREDIT TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR/GDP 
 
Level 
 
Annual 
 
CENTRAL BANK CREDIT TO PUBLIC SECTOR/GDP 
 
Level 
 
Annual 
 
SHORT TERM CAPITAL INFLOWS/GDP 
 
Level 
 
Annual 
 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT/GDP 
 
Level 
 
Annual 
 
CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCE/GDP 
 
Level 
 
Annual 
 
CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCE/INVESTMENT 
 
Level 
 
Annual 
 
Source: The authors. 
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Table 1.4 Country coverage and sample period 
 
 
Africa: 
 
 
 
 
 
South Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
Asia: 
 
 
 
 
 
Indonesia 
 
Korea 
 
Malaysia 
 
Philippines 
 
Thailand 
 
 
 
Europe and the Middle East:  
 
 
 
 
 
Czech Republic 
 
Denmark 
 
Egypt 
 
Finland 
 
Greece 
 
Israel 
 
Norway 
 
Spain 
 
Sweden 
 
Turkey 
 
 
 
 
 
Latin America: 
 
 
 
 
 
Argentina 
 
Bolivia 
 
Brazil 
 
Chile 
 
Colombia 
 
Mexico 
 
Peru 
 
Uruguay 
 
Venezuela 
 
 
On the positive side of the ledger, monthly data permit us to learn much more about the 
timing of early warning indicators, including differences among indicators in the first arrival and 
persistence of signals.  For the purposes of this study -- including the controversial question of 
whether there were warnings about the Asian financial crisis before the fact -- the advantages of 
monthly data seemed to outweigh the disadvantages.  In the end, we were able to assemble 
monthly data for about two thirds of our indicator variables; for the remaining third, we had to 
settle for annual data.    
(iv)  Yet a fourth element of our approach was to include a relatively wide array of 
potential early warning indicators.  We based this decision on a review of broad recurring themes 
in the literature on financial crises.  These themes encompass:  asymmetric information and bank 
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run stories that stress liquidity/currency mismatches and shocks that induce borrowers to run to 
liquidity or high quality assets; inherent instability and bandwagon theories that emphasize 
excessive credit creation and unsound finance during the expansion phase of the business cycle; 
"ready-or-not" financial liberalization stories that focus on the perils of liberalization when 
banking supervision is weak and when an extensive network of explicit and implicit government 
guarantees produces an asymmetric pay-off for increased risk taking; first and second-generation 
models of the vulnerability of fixed exchange rates to speculative attacks; and interactions of 
various kinds between currency and banking crises. 
In operational terms, this eclectic view of the origins of financial crises translates into a 
set of 25 leading indicator variables that span the real and monetary sectors of the economy, that 
contain elements of both the current and capital accounts of the balance of payments, that include 
market variables designed to capture expectations of future events, and that attempt to proxy 
certain structural changes in the economy (e.g., financial liberalization) that could affect 
vulnerability to a crisis; see Table 1.4 for the listing of these leading-indicator variables.  Note 
that in contrast to earlier empirical studies of currency and banking crises, the presence of two 
credit rating variables allows us to explicitly test the performance of credit ratings versus 
standard “economic fundamentals.”  Viewing our list of indicators as a group,  there is a parallel 
with the more established, leading-indicator analysis of business cycles where a diverse set of 
indicators, drawn from different sectors of the economy, has been chosen for their ability to 
anticipate earlier cycles.31  
                     
     
31
  See Stock and Watson (1989, 1991, 1993) for an analysis of coincident and leading indicators of the 
U.S. business cycle.  Moore (1959) and Zarnowitz (1992) also provide an earlier approach to scoring leading 
indicators of the business cycle. 
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(v) Once a set of potential leading indicators or determinants of banking and currency 
crises has been selected, a way has to be found both to identify the better performing ones among 
them and to calculate the probability of a crisis.   In most of the existing empirical crisis 
literature, this is done by estimating a multi-variate logit or probit regression model where the 
dependent variable (in each year or month) takes the value of one if that period is classified as a 
crisis and the value of zero if there is no crisis.  When such a regression is fitted on a pooled set 
of country data (i.e., a pooled cross-section of time series), the statistical significance of the 
estimated regression coefficients tell us which indicators are “significant” and which are not, and 
the predicted value of the dependent variable tells us which time periods or countries carry a 
higher or lower probability of a crisis. 
A fifth characteristic of our approach is that we use a different technique to evaluate 
individual indicators and to assess crisis vulnerability across countries and over time.  
Specifically, we adopt the non-parametric “signals approach” pioneered by Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1996).32  The basic premise of this approach is that the economy behaves differently on 
the eve of financial crises and that this aberrant behavior has a recurrent systemic pattern.  For 
example, currency crises are usually preceded by an overvaluation of the currency, and banking 
crises tend to follow sharp declines in asset prices. The signals approach is given diagnostic and 
predictive content by specifying what is meant by an “early” warning, by defining an "optimal 
threshold" for each indicator, and by choosing one or more diagnostic statistics that measure the 
probability of experiencing a crisis. 
                     
     
32
  This approach is described in detail in Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998). 
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We set the early warning window for currency crises at 1 to 24 months before the start of 
the crisis.  For banking crises, “early” is defined as a 24 month window beginning 12 months 
before the start of the crisis and extending 12 months after the start.  We chose this less 
demanding window because banking crises typically last much longer than currency crises and 
because the peak of the banking crises often occurs quite a while after the onset; see the 
discussion later in this chapter.  As such, even a warning that takes place after a banking crisis 
starts can be helpful. 
By requiring the specification of an explicit early warning window, the signals approach 
forces one to be quite specific about the timing of early warnings.  This is not the case for all 
other approaches.  For example, it has been argued that an asymmetric information approach to 
financial crises implies that the spread between low and high quality bonds will be a good 
indicator of whether an economy is experiencing a true financial crisis -- but there is no 
presumption that this spread should be a leading rather than a contemporaneous indicator.33  
Similarly, many of the regression-based studies of financial crisis are focused on identifying the 
determinants of banking and currency crises but usually (particularly if annual data are 
employed) do not explore in any depth if and by how much these determinants lead the onset of 
crises; as such, they generally do not pay much attention to where (i.e., for which indicators) the 
first signs of a crisis are likely to surface.  
                     
     
33
  See Mishkin (1996). 
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   We define the optimal threshold for an indicator as the value of the indicator that, once 
reached, maximizes that indicator's ability to accurately forecast a crisis.  This threshold is 
calculated using an iterative search procedure.  Suppose, for example, we want to know the 
optimal threshold for current-account imbalances preceding currency crises.  We start with an 
arbitrary tail of the distribution for current-account imbalances, say, the 15 percent tail (in each 
country) that contains the largest ratios of current-account deficits to GDP.  We then pool these 
observations on large current-account deficits across countries.  We regard any observation that 
falls in the 15 percent tail as a signal.  Its a “true” signal if a currency crisis occurs within 24 
months after the signal was given, and its a false signal or “noise” if no crisis occurs during the 
early-warning window.  We then experiment with different tails (going from 20 to 10 percent) 
until we find the one, that is, the optimal threshold, that maximizes the number of true signals 
and minimizes the number of false signals.  Too inclusive a threshold will send too much noise; 
too selective a threshold will miss too many crises.  The optimal threshold balances these 
conflicting considerations by calculating the one that minimizes the noise-to-signal ratio.   
Note that while the optimal threshold percentage for a given indicator is the same for all 
countries, this percentage is likely to translate into a different specific value for each country.  
Consider the following illustration.  Country A has a history of large current-account deficits 
during the sample period, say, averaging 5 percent of GDP; in contrast, country B has, on 
average, run a balanced external position.  Suppose the optimal threshold for the entire 25-
country sample is calculated to be 10 percent.  Applying that 10 percent tail to country A's own 
frequency distribution may yield a critical value for current-account deficits of say, 8 percent of 
GDP, whereas for country B, the same 10 percent tail may correspond to a critical value on only 
3 percent of GDP.  Put in other words, the signals approach “custom tailors” the country-specific 
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threshold to the country's own history for that indicator.  It also follows that the optimal 
thresholds (as well as the country-specific critical values) for a given indicator will often differ 
as between banking and currency crises. 
Calculation of the optimal thresholds in terms of noise-to-signal ratios also provides a 
convenient metric for comparing the performance of the individual indicators themselves.  Those 
indicators with low noise-to-signal ratios are regarded as better early warning indicators of crises 
than those with higher ones. 
Finally, under the signal approach, we can rank the probability of crises both across 
countries at a point in time and for a given country (or group of countries) over time by 
calculating the weighted number of indicators that have reached their optimal thresholds  (are 
"flashing"), where the weights (represented by the inverse of the individual noise-to-signal 
ratios) capture the relative past forecasting track record of the individual indicators.34  Indicators 
with good track records receive higher weight in the forecast that those with poorer ones.  Ceteris 
paribus, the greater the incidence of flashing indicators, the higher the presumed probability of a 
banking or currency crisis.   For example, if in mid-1997, we were to find that 18 of 25 indicators 
were flashing for Thailand versus only 5 of 25 for Brazil, we would conclude that Thailand was 
more vulnerable to a crisis than Brazil.  Analogously, if only 10 of 25 indicators were flashing 
for Thailand in mid-1993, we would conclude that Thailand was less vulnerable in mid-1993 
than it was in mid-1997.  Note that by specifying the probability of a crisis as a weighted average 
of the number of indicators that have reached their optimal thresholds, the signals approach 
makes it easy computationally to monitor crisis vulnerability.  In contrast, the regression-based 
                     
     
34
  While this is one of only many potential "composite" indicators (i.e., ways of combining the 
information in the individual indicators), Kaminsky (1998) provides evidence that this weighting scheme shows 
better in-sample and out-of-sample performance than three alternative.  Also, note that one can equivalently evaluate 
the performance of individual indicators by comparing their conditional probabilities of signalling a crisis.   
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approaches require estimation of the entire model to calculate crisis probabilities; in addition, 
because these regression-based models are non-linear, it becomes difficult to calculate the 
contribution of individual indicators to crisis probabilities in cases where the variables are far 
away from their means.35   
(vi)  Guideline number six is to employ out-of-sample tests to help gauge the usefulness 
of leading indicators.  The in-sample performance of a model may convey a misleading sense of 
optimism about how well it will perform out of sample.  A good case in point is the experience 
of the 1970s with structural models of exchange rate determination for the major currencies.  
While these model fit well in sample, subsequent research indicated that their out-of-sample 
performance was no better --and often worse -- than that of “naive” models (e.g., using the spot 
rate or the forward rate to predict next period's exchange rate).36  In this study, we use data from 
the 1970-95 period to calculate our optimal thresholds for the indicators but we save data from 
1996 through end-1997 to assess the out-of-sample performance of the signals approach, 
including the ability to identify the countries most affected during the Asian financial crisis. 
                     
     
35
  Of course, ease of application is only one among many criteria for choosing among competing crisis-
forecasting methodologies.  For example, the signals approach also carries the disadvantage that is less amenable to 
statistical tests of significance; in addition, some of the restrictions it imposes (e.g., that indicators send a signal only 
when they reach a threshold) may not be consistent with the data. 
     
36
  See Meese and Rogoff (1982). 
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(vii)  Our seventh and last guideline is to beware of the limitations of this kind of 
analysis.  Because these exercises concentrate on the macroeconomic environment, they are not 
capable of capturing the kind of political triggers and exogenous events -- such as the Danish 
referendum on EMU in 1992 or the Colosio assassination in 1994 -- that often have an important 
influence on the precise timing of speculative attacks.  Because high frequency data are not 
available on most of the institutional characteristics of national banking systems -- ranging from 
the extent of "connected" and government-directed lending to the adequacy of bank capital and 
banking supervision -- such exercises can also not be expected to capture some of these longer-
term origins of banking crises.  Also, because we are not dealing with structural economic 
models but rather with loose reduced-form relationships, such leading-indicator exercises do not 
generate much information on why or how the indicators affect the probability of a crisis.  For 
example, a finding that exchange rate overvaluation typically precedes a currency crisis does not 
tell us whether the exchange rate overvaluation results from a rigidly fixed exchange rate regime 
that has overstayed its welcome or from a surge of private capital inflows; and it cannot inform 
us whether the source of vulnerability is a loss of competitiveness for the country's traded goods 
or a mismatched foreign-currency position on the part of banks or their corporate customers 
which will result in a banking crisis once the rate is devalued.  Nor is the early warning study of 
financial crises immune from the "Lucas critique:"  that is, if a reliable set of early warning 
indicators were identified empirically, it is possible that policymakers would henceforth behave 
differently when these indicators were flashing than they did in the past, thereby transforming 
these variables into early warning indicators of corrective policy action rather than of indicators 
of financial crisis.  While this feedback effect of the indicators on crisis prevention has 
apparently not been strong enough in the past to eradicate the predictive content of the indicators, 
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there is no guarantee that this feedback effect wouldn't be stronger in the future (particularly if 
the empirical evidence in favor of robust early warning indicators of crises was subsequently 
viewed as more persuasive). 
Much like the leading-indicator analysis of business cycles, we are engaging here in a 
mechanical exercise -- albeit one that we think is interesting on a number of fronts.  Moreover, it 
needs to be kept in mind that this research is still in its infancy, with many of the key empirical 
contributions coming only in the last two to three years.  In areas like the modelling of contagion 
and alternative approaches to out-of-sample forecasting, there hasn't been time to run enough 
"horse races" to know which approaches work best.  For all of these reasons, we see the leading-
indicator analysis of financial crises in emerging economies as one among a number of analytical 
tools for studying financial crises in emerging economies and not as a stand-alone, sure-fire 
system for predicting where the next crisis will take place.  That being said, we also argue that 
this approach shows promising signs of generating real value added, and that it appears 
particularly useful as a first screen for gauging the ordinal differences in vulnerability to crises 
both across countries and over time.  
The rest of this study is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 takes up in more detail the 
leading methodological issues surrounding the forecasting of crisis vulnerability, including the 
choice of sample countries, the definition of currency and banking crises, the selection of 
leading-indicators, the specification of the early warning window, and the signals approach to 
calculating optimal thresholds for indicators and the probability of a crisis.   
Chapter 3 presents the main empirical results for the in-sample estimation (1970-95), 
with a focus on the best-performing monthly and annual indicators, on a comparison of credit 
ratings and interest rate spreads with indicators of economic "fundamentals," and on the ability 
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of the signals approach to predict accurately earlier currency and banking crises.  In Chapter 4, 
we analyze the track record of rating agencies in forecasting currency and banking crises. 
In Chapter 5, we use two overlapping  out-of-sample periods (namely beginning-1996 
through mid-1997, and beginning-1996 through end-1997) to project which emerging economies 
were recently the most vulnerable to currency and banking crises.  This exercise also permits us 
to gauge the performance of the model in anticipating the Asian financial crisis.   In Chapter 6, 
we analyze the contagion of financial crises across countries, with particular emphasis on how 
fundamentals-based contagion is influenced by trade and financial-sector links. The following 
chapter also examines data on the aftermath of crisis to provide an assessment of how long it will 
be before the recovery from the Asian crisis takes hold.  Finally, Chapter 8 contains some brief 
concluding remarks, along with suggestions for how the leading-indicator analysis of currency 
and banking crises in emerging economies might be improved. 
 
Summary of findings 
  Our empirical findings can be summarized conveniently into twelve main points. 
(i)  Banking and currency crises in emerging markets do not typically come out of the 
blue--without any warning.  There are recurring patterns of behavior in the period leading up to 
banking and currency crises.  Reflecting this tendency, the better-performing leading indicators 
anticipate between 50 and 100 percent of the banking and currency crises that occurred over our 
25 year sample period.  In addition, we find consistently that both the average number of signals 
and the frequency of extreme signals are much higher during crises than during normal times.  At 
the same time, even the best leading indicators send a significant share of false alarms (on the 
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order of one false alarm for every two to five true signals).37  
(ii)  Using monthly data, banking crises in emerging economies are more difficult to 
forecast accurately than are currency crises.  Within sample, the average noise-to-signal ratio is 
higher for banking crises than for currency crises, and the model likewise does better out-of-
sample in predicting currency crises than banking crises.  It is not yet clear why this is so.  It may 
reflect difficulties in dating accurately banking crises, that is, in judging when banking sector 
distress turns into a crisis and when banking crises end.  For example, by our criteria, banking 
distress in Indonesia and Mexico really began in 1992 (and not in 1997 and 1994, respectively).  
The absence of high-frequency (monthly or quarterly) data on the institutional characteristics of 
national banking systems probably also is a factor.    
                     
     
37  This ratio comes from our estimated “adjusted” noise-to-signal ratios.  By “adjusted,” we mean ratios 
that are adjusted for the fact that the number of months in which a false signal could have been issued is different 
from the number of months that a true signal could have been issued; see Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998).   
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(iii)  There is wide variation in performance across leading indicators, with the best-
performing indicators displaying noise-to-signal ratios that are in the neighborhood of two to 
three times better than those for the worst-performing ones.38  In addition, the group of indicators 
that show the best (in sample) explanatory power also seem, on average, to send the most 
persistent and earliest signals.  Warnings of a crisis usually appear 10 to 18 months prior to the 
outset. 
(iv)  For currency crises, the best of the monthly indicators were:  appreciation of the real 
exchange rate (relative to trend), a decline in equity prices, a fall in exports, a high ratio of broad 
money (M2) to international reserves, a low ratio of international reserves by itself, and excess 
narrow-money (M1) balances; a recession just misses the top group.  Among the annual 
indicators, the two best performers were both current-account indicators, namely, a large current-
account deficit relative to both GDP and investment; see Table 1.5. 
 
 
                     
     
38  When an indicator has a noise-to-signal ratio above one, crises would be more likely when the indicator 
was not sending a signal than when it was.  Similarly, when an indicator has a conditional probability of less than 
zero, it means that the probability of a crisis occurring when the indicator is signaling is lower than the 
unconditional probability of a crisis occurring, that is, merely estimating the probability of a the crisis according to 
its historical average; for example, if currency crises occur in a third of the months in the sample, the unconditional 
probability of a crisis is one third. 
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TABLE 1.5. Currency and banking crises: 
Best performing indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
CURRENCY CRISES 
 
BANKING CRISES 
 
High-frequency Indicators 
 
 
 
REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
 
REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
 
 
 
BANKING CRISIS 
 
EQUITY PRICES 
 
 
 
EQUITY PRICES 
 
M2 MULTIPLIER 
 
 
 
EXPORTS 
 
REAL OUTPUT 
 
 
 
M2/INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 
 
EXPORTS 
 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 
 
REAL INTEREST RATE ON 
DEPOSITS 
 
Low-Frequency Indicators 
 
 
 
CURRENT ACCOUNT 
IMBALANCE/GDP 
 
SHORT-TERM CAPITAL 
INFLOWS/GDP 
 
 
 
CURRENT ACCOUNT 
IMBALANCE/INVESTMENT 
 
CURRENT ACCOUNT 
IMBALANCE/INVESTMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The authors, Chapters 3-5. 
 
    (v)  Turning to banking crises, the best (in descending order) of the 15 monthly indicators 
were:  appreciation of the real exchange rate (relative to trend), a decline in equity prices, a rise 
in the (M2) money multiplier, a decline in real output, a fall in exports, and a rise in the real 
interest rate.  Among the eight annual indicators tested, the best of the pack were a high ratio of 
short-term capital flows to GDP and a large current-account deficit relative to investment; see 
Table 1.4. 
(vi)  While there is a good deal of overlap between the best-performing leading indicators 
for banking and currency crises, there is enough of a distinction to warrant treating the two 
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separately.  To highlight but two noteworthy differences, the two indicators that serve as proxies 
for financial liberalization -- namely, a rise in the real interest rate and an increase in the money 
multiplier -- turned out to be more important leading indicators for banking crises than for 
currency crises, whereas the opposite proved true for the two indicators designed to capture 
currency and maturity mismatches and excessively expansionary monetary policy -- namely, a 
high ratio of broad (M2) money balances to international reserves and excess M1 money 
balances, respectively.   
(vii)  While our data on sovereign credit ratings cover only a subsample of crises and 
relate to only two of the major rating firms (Institutional Investor and Moody's Investor 
Services), we find that changes in sovereign credit ratings have performed considerably worse 
than the better leading indicators of economic fundamentals in anticipating both currency and 
banking crises in emerging economies.  In addition, we find no empirical support for the view 
that rating changes have led financial crises in our sample countries rather than reacting to these 
crises.  In a similar vein, we have found that interest rate spreads (i.e., foreign-domestic real 
interest rate differentials) are not among the best-performing group of leading indicators.  Those 
who are looking to "market prices" for early warning of crises in emerging economies would 
therefore be advised to focus on the behavior of real exchange rates and of equity prices -- not on 
credit ratings and interest rate spreads. 
(viii)  In most banking and currency crises, a high proportion of the (monthly) leading 
indicators -- on the order of 50-75 percent reach their danger thresholds.  Indeed, both in and out-
of-sample, we found that fewer than one-sixth of crises occurred with only five or fewer of the 
(15 monthly) leading indicators flashing.  Put in other words, when an emerging economy is 
lurching toward a financial crisis, many of the wheels come off simultaneously. 
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(ix)  Although we have just scratched the surface on testing our leading indicators out of 
sample, we are encouraged by the initial results.  
We considered two out-of-sample periods:  an 18 month period running from the 
beginning of 1996 to end-June 1997 (just prior to the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis), and 
a 24 month period running from January 1996 to end-December 1997.  Recall that because the 
indicators lead crises by anywhere from 10 to 18 months, part of the prediction period will lie 
outside the out-of-sample observation period. 
In each period, we concentrated on the ordinal ranking of countries according to their 
crisis vulnerability.  Our preferred measure of vulnerability was an index equal to the weighted 
average of "good" indicators issuing signals in the out-of-sample period.  By "good" indicators, 
we mean those that had noise-to-signal ratios less than unity during the 1970-95 period (i.e., 
marginal forecasting probabilities greater than zero); taking the monthly and annual indicators as 
a group, there were 18 "good" indicators. We used the inverse of the noise-to-signal ratios as 
weights.  We then ranked each of the 25 countries in the sample according to the computed value 
of this index.  The index is meant to capture the probability of a crisis -- not necessarily its 
severity. 
As regards vulnerability to currency crises, the results for the two out-of-sample periods 
were quite similar.  The eight most vulnerable countries (in descending order) for the 1996 to 
mid-1997 period were as follows:  Czech Republic, South Korea, Greece, Thailand, South 
Africa, Colombia, Turkey, and the Philippines; see Table 1.6.  For the somewhat longer 1996 to 
end-December 1997 period, the list of the eight most vulnerable countries was identical, 
although their ordinal ranking was slightly different, namely (again in descending order):  Czech 
Republic, Thailand, South Korea, Greece, the Philippines, South Africa, Colombia, and Turkey.  
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If the most vulnerable list was extended to the top ten, Finland and Malaysia would have been 
included in the first period, and Norway and Malaysia in the second one.   
Table 1.6: Vulnerability to currency crises 
 
 
 January 1996-June 1997 
 
January 1996-December 1997 
 
Country 
 
Weighted 
Index1 
 
Rank 
 
Crisis2 
 
Country 
 
Weighted 
Index1 
 
Rank  
 
Crisis2 
 
Most Vulnerable 
 
Czech 
Republic  
 
24.54 
 
1 
 
* 
 
Czech 
Republic 
 
24.54 
 
1 
 
* 
 
South 
Korea 
 
20.55 
 
2 
 
* 
 
Thailand 
 
22.96 
 
2 
 
* 
 
Greece 
 
20.05 
 
3 
 
 
 
South 
Korea 
 
22.31 
 
3 
 
* 
 
Thailand 
 
18.74 
 
4 
 
* 
 
Greece 
 
17.97 
 
4 
 
 
 
South 
Africa 
 
15.12 
 
5 
 
 
 
Philippines 
 
16.18 
 
5 
 
* 
 
Colombia 
 
14.26 
 
6 
 
* 
 
South 
Africa 
 
15.12 
 
6 
 
 
 
Turkey 
 
14.25 
 
7 
 
 
 
Colombia 
 
14.26 
 
7 
 
* 
 
Philippines 
 
14.05 
 
8 
 
* 
 
Turkey 
 
14.25 
 
8 
 
 
 
Least Vulnerable 
 
Brazil 
 
6.27 
 
18 
 
 
 
Denmark 
 
7.53 
 
18 
 
 
 
Peru 
 
6.10 
 
19 
 
 
 
Chile 
 
7.30 
 
19 
 
 
 
Egypt 
 
5.39 
 
20 
 
 
 
Brazil 
 
6.27 
 
20 
 
 
 
Chile 
 
4.55 
 
21 
 
 
 
Peru 
 
6.10 
 
21 
 
 
 
Argentina 
 
4.51 
 
22 
 
 
 
Argentina 
 
4.51 
 
22 
 
 
 
Uruguay 
 
1.75 
 
23 
 
 
 
Indonesia 
 
3.43 
 
23 
 
* 
 
Mexico 
 
1.47 
 
24 
 
 
 
Uruguay 
 
1.75 
 
24 
 
 
 
Indonesia 
 
1.30 
 
25 
 
* 
 
Mexico 
 
1.47 
 
25 
 
 
 
1 Weighted index is a sum of the weighted signals flashing at any time during the specified period. 
  Monthly and annual indicators are included. Weights are equal to the inverse noise:signal ratios of 
  the respective indicators 
 
2 An asterisk indicates that the country experience a crisis during the out-of-sample period. 
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Perhaps the first question to ask is how many of the countries estimated to be most 
vulnerable to currency crises in the out-of-sample period(s) turned out to have undergone such 
crises?  The answer, as shown in the upper panel of Table 1.6, is almost three quarters of them.  
According to our index of exchange market pressure, the Czech Republic, Thailand, South 
Korea, the Philippines, and Colombia all experienced currency crises in 1997 (that is, 
depreciations or reserve losses that pushed the index of exchange market pressure to three 
standard deviations or more above its mean).  Moreover, while South Africa did not formally 
make the cut, it could reasonably be classified as a near miss since it experienced a quasi-crisis in 
June 1998 (a 14 percent devaluation cum a 13 percent decline in reserves that pushed the 
exchange market pressure index 2.7 standard deviations above its mean).  Greece underwent an 
11 percent devaluation in March 1998 but since it was accompanied by a large reserve gain, it 
didn't quite qualify.  Malaysia, which just made it into the top-ten most vulnerable group, did 
have a currency crisis in 1997.  So did Norway (in the form of a large reserve loss in late 1997), 
which made it into the top ten list in the first out-of-sample period but not in the second.   The 
most serious missclassification in the top vulnerability group was Turkey, which was estimated 
to have medium-high vulnerability (that is, ordinal vulnerability rankings of 7 or 8 out of 25 
countries) but did not experience a crisis during or close to the out-of-sample period. 
Further information on the out-of-sample performance of the leading indicators of 
currency crisis can be gleaned by looking for episodes where, to borrow a theme from Sherlock 
Holmes, the "dogs were not barking,"  that is, by looking to see how often crises occurred among 
those countries estimated to have relatively low vulnerability.  The lower panel of Table 1.6 
indicates the eight countries that were estimated to have relatively low vulnerability to currency 
crises in 1996-1997.  As with the high vulnerability group, the ordinal rankings of countries are 
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very similar across the two out-of-sample periods, with Mexico, Indonesia, and Uruguay heading 
the least vulnerable list, and with Argentina, Chile, Peru, Brazil, and Egypt rounding out the top 
eight.  Here too, with the important exception of Indonesia, there are relatively few poor 
forecasts of crises.  More specifically, excluding Indonesia, in none of the least vulnerable 
countries does the calculated index of exchange market pressure reach even two standard 
deviations above its mean during the out-of-sample period.  If we extend the period out farther, 
Brazil might conceivably be regarded as a miss classification since it does get very close to a 
currency crisis (with the index hitting 2.9) but that comes quite a bit later, not until September 
1998.   
But what about Indonesia which after all suffered the most severe currency crisis 
(beginning in December 1997) among the sample countries during the out-of-sample period?  
Why did the model miss it so badly?39  The explanation probably lies in two areas.  First, most of 
the best-performing (higher weight) leading indicators were not flashing in Indonesia's case.  For 
example, in mid-1997 (just before the outbreak of the Thai crisis), the real effective exchange 
rate of the Indonesian rupiah was only 4 percent above its long-term average --far below its 
optimal threshold; in a similar vein, neither the decline in equity prices, nor the decline in 
exports, nor the change in the ratio of M2 money balances to international reserves, had hit their 
threshold values.40  Second, at least three of the factors important in the Indonesian crisis are not 
included in our list of indicators, namely, currency/liquidity mismatches on the part of the 
corporate sector, regional cross-county contagion effects, and political instabilities (in this case, 
                     
     
39
  It should be recognized that none of the existing early warning models -- including the regression-based 
models, is able to anticipate the Indonesian crisis. 
     
40
  Indonesia's equity prices did suffer a severe decline but it did not begin until August 1997. 
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associated with the Suharto regime).  In this connection, work reported in Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1998b) and extended in Chapter 6 suggests that the withdrawal of a common bank 
lender (in this case, Japanese banks) had a lot to do with contagion in emerging Asia after the 
outbreak of the Thai crisis. 
   The failure of our leading indicators to anticipate the Indonesian crisis should not, 
however, obscure the fact that of the five countries most adversely affected by the Asian crisis 
(Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines), the indicators placed three of 
the them (Thailand, South Korea, and the Philippines) in the top vulnerability group and another 
(Malaysia) in the upper third of the country-vulnerability rankings.  Given the well-documented 
failure of private credit ratings and interest rate spreads to anticipate these Asian currency crises 
(with the possible exception of Thailand), and given that these forecasts are based solely on own-
country fundamentals (that is, with no help from contagion variables), this performance on 
relative-country vulnerabilities is noteworthy.  By the same token, the relatively high estimated 
vulnerability of several of the Asian emerging economies also challenges the oft-heard view that 
the crisis was driven primarily by investor panic, with little basis in weak country 
fundamentals.41 
                     
      
41  Using a very similar approach (cum an expanded set of indicators), Kaminsky (1998) presents a time-
series of calculated crisis probabilities for the Asian economies and finds that estimated currency-crisis vulnerability 
increased markedly before the 1997 event in Thailand, and moderately in Malaysia and the Philippines.  Again, no 
such increase in estimated vulnerability was present for Indonesia.  Korea was not in her sample.  Sachs and Radelet 
(1998) take the opposing view that the crisis in Asia was mainly attributable to investor panic. 
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Turning to banking crises, the ordinal rankings of country vulnerability again are quite 
similar across the two out-of-sample periods, although the correspondence is slightly lower than 
was the case for currency crises: six of the eight countries estimated to be most vulnerable to 
banking crises are the same across the two periods.  Specifically, for the 1996 to mid-1997 
period, the eight most vulnerable countries (again in descending order) were:  Czech Republic, 
Greece, South Korea, Colombia, Finland, Thailand, South Africa, and the Philippines; see Table 
1.7.  When the out-of-sample period is extended through the end of 1997, South Africa and the 
Philippines drop out of the top eight (moving to eleventh and ninth, respectively) and are 
replaced by Norway and Spain.  Thus, the rankings for the 1996 to end-1997 period are as 
follows:  Czech Republic, Thailand, Greece, South Korea, Colombia, Norway, Finland, and 
Spain. 
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Table 1.7. Vulnerability to Banking Crises 
 
 
 January 1996-June 1997 
 
January 1996-December 1997 
 
Country 
 
Weighted 
Index1 
 
Rank 
 
Crisis2 
 
Country 
 
Weighted 
Index1 
 
Rank  
 
Crisis2 
 
Most Vulnerable 
 
Czech 
Republic  
 
24.87 
 
1 
 
 
 
Czech 
Republic 
 
24.87 
 
1 
 
 
 
Greece 
 
20.28 
 
2 
 
 
 
Thailand 
 
21.72 
 
2 
 
* 
 
South 
Korea 
 
19.93 
 
3 
 
* 
 
Greece 
 
20.28 
 
3 
 
 
 
Colombia 
 
17.53 
 
4 
 
 
 
South 
Korea 
 
19.93 
 
4 
 
* 
 
Finland 
 
16.12 
 
5 
 
 
 
Colombia 
 
17.53 
 
5 
 
 
 
Thailand 
 
14.49 
 
6 
 
* 
 
Norway 
 
17.21 
 
6 
 
 
 
South 
Africa 
 
12.95 
 
7 
 
 
 
Finland 
 
16.12 
 
7 
 
 
 
Philippines 
 
12.52 
 
8 
 
 
 
Spain 
 
16.03 
 
8 
 
 
 
Least Vulnerable 
 
Denmark 
 
6.83 
 
18 
 
 
 
Chile 
 
8.86 
 
18 
 
 
 
Venezuela 
 
6.38 
 
19 
 
 
 
Argentina 
 
8.51 
 
19 
 
 
 
Brazil 
 
6.08 
 
20 
 
 
 
Venezuela 
 
7.85 
 
20 
 
 
 
Mexico 
 
4.45 
 
21 
 
 
 
Indonesia 
 
7.68 
 
21 
 
 
 
Chile 
 
4.23 
 
22 
 
 
 
Brazil 
 
7.55 
 
22 
 
 
 
Egypt 
 
3.96 
 
23 
 
 
 
Denmanrk 
 
6.83 
 
23 
 
 
 
Uruguay 
 
3.88 
 
24 
 
 
 
Mexico 
 
4.45 
 
24 
 
 
 
Indonesia 
 
2.84 
 
25 
 
 
 
Uruguay 
 
3.88 
 
25 
 
 
 
1 Weighted index is a sum of the weighted signals flashing at any time during the specified period. 
  Monthly and annual indicators are included. Weights are equal to the inverse noise-to-signal ratios of 
  the respective indicators 
 
2 An asterisk indicates that the country experience a crisis during the out-of-sample period. 
 
As with the vulnerability rankings for currency crises, it is useful to ask which of the 
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countries estimated to be most vulnerable to banking crises actually suffered that fate during the 
out-of-sample periods.  As suggested earlier, this is intrinsically a tougher question to answer for 
banking crises (than for currency crises) because the identification and dating of crises are 
subject to wider margins of error.  Recall also that because we our 24 month early-warning 
window for banking crises covers both the 12 month period preceding the beginning of the crisis 
as well as the 12 month period following the onset, successful predictions would include some 
crises that began toward the end of 1995 and some that started no later than early 1998 (as well 
as those that began in 1996 or 1997).  
With these caveats in mind, the picture painted by Table 1.6 can be summarized as 
follows.  Of the eight countries estimated to be most vulnerable in the January 1996 to end-June 
1997 sample, two  experienced banking crises that fall in our prediction window.  Specifically, 
we consider South Korea's banking crisis to have begun in January 1997 with the loan losses 
stemming from the bankruptcy of Hanbo Steel; in a similar vein, we date Thailand's banking 
crisis as starting in May 1996 when the Ministry of Finance took control of Bankgok Bank of 
Finance (following a run on deposits).  A third member of the most vulnerable group, the Czech 
Republic, also experienced a banking crisis although the timing is not clear cut: the start of the 
Czech crisis could be dated in August 1996 reflecting the closure of Kreditini Banka; 
alternatively, one could also defend a much earlier starting date, namely September 1993 when 
Kreditni was initially placed under supervision.42  Some researchers (e.g., Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1998)) also classify Malaysia and the Philippines as having registered banking crises in 
1997.  The results for the longer out-of-sample period, shown in the upper panel of Table 1.6, are 
                     
     
42
  The Czech banking crisis was not included in our in-sample test and hence, the model is not calibrated 
to account for this crisis. 
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quite similar:  the same three countries (South Korea, Thailand, and Czech Republic) make up 
the list of successful banking-crisis predictions.  
What about the group of countries estimated to be least vulnerable to banking crises?  As 
seen in the lower panel of Table 1.6, seven of the eight countries in this category are common to 
both sample periods, namely, Uruguay, Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Denmark, and 
Chile; Egypt appears only in the shorter period, while Argentina makes the least vulnerable list 
only in the longer period.  For five of the seven countries estimated to be least vulnerable, no 
banking crisis appears to have taken place during the out-of-sample periods.  As was the case 
with the forecasting of currency crises, Indonesia emerges as a major misclassification, although 
timing problems cloud somewhat the issue.  Many observers would regard the severity of 
Indonesia's financial-sector problems in 1997 as constituting a “new” banking crisis; others 
might argue that these difficulties constituted a continuation of the banking problems that began 
in 1992 with the collapse of Bank Summa.  In any case, it is clear that the model was not picking 
up the increase in Indonesia's vulnerability in 1997.  Mexico presents another timing problem.  
Mexico remained in the throes of a banking crisis throughout the out-of-sample period and thus 
could be classified as highly vulnerable.  At the same time, most studies (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detriache (1997) and IMF (1998b)) regard the Mexican banking crisis as having started at 
least as early as 1994; here too, the model seems to have difficulty in identifying changes in 
vulnerability when they occur in the context of the continuation of banking problems.   
Looking at both the high and low vulnerability groups, it is clear that the early-warning 
model is less successful out-of-sample in anticipating banking crises than it is in anticipating 
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currency crises.  The problem is not so much that the model misses many banking crises that do 
occur but rather that it generates too much "noise", that is, it predicts more cases of banking-
crisis vulnerability than actually occur.  In this connection, it is worth noting that we classify 
only five or six episodes as meeting our criteria for banking crisis during the out-of-sample 
period (that is, the period running roughly from late 1995 to early 1998).  This list comprises 
South Korea, Thailand, the Czech Republic, Indonesia, Mexico, and Malaysia.43  Of these six 
crisis cases, three of the countries concerned (South Korea, Thailand, and the Czech Republic) 
were members of our "most vulnerable" group and  the three others (Indonesia, Mexico, and 
Malaysia) were not.44  This might be considered fair performance.  More worrisome is the 
finding that five of the eight other members of the high vulnerability group did not experience 
banking crises during the out-of-sample period.  Difficulties in forecasting Asian banking crises 
in 1997 seem to be common to the leading forecasting models -- be they signals-approach 
models or regression-based models.  For example, Demirgic-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), using 
a multi-variate logit model, report that the conditional probabilities for banking crises in the five 
most adversely-affected Asian economies were actually below the unconditional crisis 
probabilities.45  Similarly, Kaminsky (1998) finds that estimated crisis probabilities are rising 
sharply in the case of the Thai banking crisis and moderately for the case of the Philippines, but 
not for either Malaysia or Indonesia.                
We conducted a number of experiments to help gauge the robustness of our results on the 
                     
     
43
  The Malaysian crisis would probably best be regarded as beginning in March 1998 when the central 
bank announced losses at Sime Bank and elsewhere, and when Malaysian President Mahatir pledged state funds to 
prop up weak institutions. 
     
44
  Malaysia was ranked fourteenth (out of 25 countries) in the shorter period and tenth in the longer one. 
     
45
  See Furnam and Stiglitz (1998). 
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ordinal ranking of country vulnerability to currency and banking crises.  In one exercise, instead 
of basing the ordinal vulnerability rankings exclusively on weights derived from the noise-to-
signal ratios, we looked at the both the proportion of indicators signaling a crisis and the 
proportion of the top nine indicators signaling a crisis.   In another exercise, we looked at various 
indicators signaling both banking and currency crises, and calculated "average" vulnerability to 
banking and currency crises combined.  And in yet another set of exercises, we liberalized the 
optimal thresholds for each of the indicators by 5 percent, thereby making it less likely that we 
would miss crisis that were unfolding, albeit at the cost of predicting crises that never occurred.  
While these robustness exercises not surprisingly generated some changes in the ordinal 
rankings, perhaps the most important finding was that a set of five or six countries -- namely, the 
Czech Republic, South Korea, South Africa, Greece, Columbia, Thailand, the Philippines, and 
Malaysia -- consistently remained in the top tier of the vulnerability list.   All in all, we regard 
the out-of-sample performance of the signals approach as encouraging -- particularly as regards 
anticipating currency crises in the Asian crisis countries.46  With the exception of Indonesia -- 
and to a lesser extent Malaysia, the model did well in identifying the countries with relatively 
high vulnerability.  In addition, the model gave strong signals for the Czech Republic, South 
Africa, Greece, and Colombia which also experienced crises outside the Asian region.  The 
results for banking crises were less impressive.  While we would not place much confidence in 
the precise estimated ordering of vulnerability across countries, we think the signals approach 
looks promising for making course distinctions between the vulnerability of countries near the 
                     
     
46
  This is consistent with the results of a recent IMF study ((Berg and Pattillo (1998)) that found that the 
signals model of Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) did a better job of predicting the Asian crisis than the 
models of Frankel and Rose (1996) and of Sachs et al (1996).  At the same time, Berg and Pattillo (1998) argue that 
some of the key assumptions of the signals approach are not supported by empirical tests and that one could obtain 
better predictions of the Asian crisis by embedding the better-performing indicators of the signals approach within a 
probit framework. 
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top of the list and those near the bottom, that is, it may be useful as a "first screen," which can 
then be followed up by more in-depth country analysis. 
Some others are more pessimistic about both the potential and actual out-of-sample 
performance of signals-based leading-indicator models of currency crises, including their track 
record in anticipating the Asian financial crisis.47  The criticisms here include the arguments:  
that when such models do seemingly perform well, it is often because they rely on "black box" 
simple contagion variables (e.g., the number of crises that have occurred in the previous period); 
that the methodology embedded in the signals approach is biased toward overpredicting crises in 
countries with good histories and this explains its successes in predicting currency crises in Asia; 
that both in-sample and out-of-sample performance would be better if the good indicator 
variables were entered linearly (rather than sending a signal only when the indicator crossed its 
threshold) and if the weights on the individual indicators were estimated by a regression (rather 
than selected from an iterative noise-to-signal test, one at a time); that the correlation between 
the severity of observed currency crises and crisis vulnerability predicted by the signals approach 
was low (at least in 1996); and that (also in 1996) there did not seem to be a marked distinction 
between the calculated currency crisis vulnerabilities of several non-crisis countries (particularly 
the Philippines, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico) and the Asian crisis countries (Thailand and 
Indonesia). 
We take up these criticisms in some detail in Chapter ?  Here, it is sufficient to offer the 
following rebuttal. 
                     
     
47
  See Berg and Pattillo (1998), the Economist (1998), Furnam and Stiglitz (1998), and the IMF (1998c). 
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  In the two studies (Berg and Pattillo (1998) and Furnam and Stiglitz (1998)) which have 
explicitly run out-of-sample horse races between the Kaminsky-Reinhart signals model and two 
other regression-based models of currency crises (namely, the Frankel-Rose (1997) model and 
the Sachs et al (1997) model), both studies conclude that the signals approach does better. 
While we present some new results on cross-country contagion in Chapter 6, the out-of-
sample results -- both in earlier Kaminsky-Reinhart studies and in this book -- do not rely at all 
on cross-country contagion; instead, they reflect only own-country fundamentals.  
There is (at least to our knowledge) no empirical evidence to support the view that 
imposing a common absolute threshold for indicator variables would produce better in-sample 
and out-of-sample performance than (our procedure) of imposing a common percentile threshold 
and allowing the absolute threshold to differ across countries; nor, as we have argued earlier, 
does it seem more reasonable on a priori grounds to impose the one-size-fits-all restriction on 
countries with different histories; quite the contrary.  As for the alleged influence of our 
procedure in the context of forecasting the Asian financial crisis, one would have thought that if 
this bias was large, it might have led to a very successful prediction of crises in the Asian 
countries when some of these same critics find that the signals approach does very poorly in 
forecasting currency crises in these countries. 
Finally and perhaps most importantly, while more work is clearly needed to assess the 
robustness of the results to different out-of-sample periods (since these differ and seem to 
generate different outcomes across studies), we do not find that there was little distinction in 
estimated currency-crisis vulnerabilities between most of the Asian crisis countries on the one 
hand and some other (Latin American) non-crisis countries on the other.  As indicated earlier, we 
found that Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia had higher estimated currency-crisis 
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probabilities in 1996-97 than did Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico -- not the other way around.  
Thailand was near the top of our vulnerability list -- not near the bottom.  Also, it is not obvious 
that out-of-sample comparisons based on the severity of crises are more meaningful that those 
(as above) that concentrate on the crisis/no-crisis distinction.   
In short, just as we emphasized that it is important not to oversell the potential of early-
warning models to predict crises in emerging economies, we think some of the critics are too 
quick to dismiss the usefulness of these models because of a mixed out-of-sample performance 
based on runs from a single period.  We should also keep in mind the apparent inability of non-
model-based forecasts to foresee the Asian crisis.  In our view, much more empirical work will 
need to be done before we can draw reliable conclusions on the out-of-sample performance of 
the signals approach. 
(x)  Examining a somewhat more limited sample (20) of small developed and emerging 
economies over the 1970-98 period, we looked for patterns in the cross-country contagion of 
currency crises.  Our results suggest that (at least historically) contagion has operated more along 
regional than global lines, that susceptibility to contagion is highly nonlinear (rising dramatically 
if several core countries are already affected), that it is difficult to discriminate between trade and 
financial contagion links (because most countries that are linked in trade are also linked in 
finance), and that two earlier prominent episodes of contagion -- namely Argentina after the 
Mexican peso crisis and Indonesia after the Thai baht crisis -- are probably best explained in 
terms of financial linkages (specifically, withdrawal of a common commercial bank lender and 
the unwinding of cross-market hedging).48                
                     
     
48
  Note that in these two contagion episodes, bilateral and third-party trade links with the first-infected 
country were weak. 
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(xi)  In addition to studying the antecedents of crises we also drew on our data base for 
information on the aftermath of crises-- with particular attention on assessing the speed with 
which emerging economies are able to return to "normal" after a currency or banking crises.  We 
defined normal in two alternative ways:  first, as a period of "tranquility" that excludes not only 
the crisis years but also the two-to-three year windows before and after the crisis, and second, as 
the average of the two years just preceding crises.49   
                     
     
49  More specifically, the "tranquil" period excludes the 24 months before and after currency crises, and the 
24 months before and 36 months after banking crises. 
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One of our most robust findings was that the deleterious effects on economic activity are 
more lingering for banking crises than for currency crises; for example, whereas it took about 
two years for economic growth to return to the average of the two pre-crisis years in the 
aftermath of a currency crisis, that return was not evident even three years after a banking crisis.  
One possible explanation for this difference is that whereas a currency crisis reduces sharply 
external sources of funding, a banking crisis curtails access to both external and domestic 
sources of finance for households and firms, that is, the "credit crunch" is more severe in the 
wake of banking crises.  This more sluggish recovery pattern for banking crises was also evident 
for exports, imports, and equity prices.  For instance, whereas exports recover relatively quickly 
(8 months) and ahead of the rest of the economy following currency crises, they continue to sink 
for two years following the onset of a banking crisis.  Two other dimensions of the protracted 
nature of banking crises are that banking crises usually last for about ( ) years and that it takes on 
the order of a year and half between the onset of a banking crisis and its peak.  All of this paints 
a pessimistic picture for the speed of recovery in the ongoing Asian crisis:  not only are the most 
affected countries in emerging Asia suffering from currency crises that are accompanied by 
banking crises (what Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996 call "twin crises") but the banking crises 
themselves are very severe.  This suggests that recovery of economic growth in emerging Asia is 
more likely to resemble the shape of a bathtub than a V.   
Our analysis of the aftermath of crises does not lend support to the notion that 
devaluations in emerging economies generate deflation.  Instead, we find that devaluations are 
inflationary, that the pass-through to prices in incomplete (hence, they lead to real depreciations), 
and that it takes between two and three years after a devaluation for inflation to return to the 
average of the two pre-crisis years. 
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(xii)  Last but not least, we offer a number of suggestions for improving early-warning 
models of currency and banking crises. In our view, four directions for future research merit 
priority.    
First, as hinted at above, more work needs to be done to determine the out-of-sample 
forecasting properties of these models -- be it signals-approach models or regression-based logit 
or probit models.  In particular, it would be useful to know how robust are "whose next" country 
rankings of vulnerability to changes in the forecasting period, to different composite indicators, 
and to the restrictions imposed in the different models (e.g., imposing thresholds versus allowing 
indicators to enter linearly, imposing absolute thresholds versus common percentile ones, etc).  It 
may turn out, as suggested by Berg and Pattillo (1998), that it is possible to improve performance 
by combining certain features of the signals approach and the regression-based models (e.g., 
using the signals approach to select the good indicators and then estimating the weights and 
crisis probabilities using a regression-based format). 
Second, we think there is mileage in bringing other indicators into these horseraces.  For 
example, Kaminsky (1998) has found that the share of short-term debt in total foreign debt as 
well as a proxy for capital flight (by residents of emerging economies) do quite well in 
anticipating currency and banking crises within sample.  Looking at the run-up to the Asian 
financial crisis, Furnam and Stiglitz (1998) likewise make a good case for including the ratio of 
short-term external debt to international reserves as an indicator in future early-warning 
exercises.  If monthly data could be obtained both on real property prices and on the exposure of 
the banking system to property, those too could prove very helpful. 
Yet a third extension would be to bring institutional characteristics of weak banking 
systems into the forecasting of banking crises.  There is a strong presumption that weak 
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accounting, provisioning, and legal frameworks, policy-directed lending, the ownership structure 
of the banking system (government ownership, foreign ownership, etc), the incidence of 
connected lending, the extent of diversification, and the incentive-compatibility of the official 
safety net, all matter for vulnerability to banking crises.  Yet it is only very recently that any of 
these factors have begun to enter the empirical literature.50 
The main constraint on making use of these institutional characteristics is that one can't 
get high frequency measurements of them; indeed, for some of these characteristics (e.g., the 
share of government ownership), its proven difficult to get even annual data that's less than two 
or three years old.  This means that such variables have to be introduced as zero-one dummy 
variables in a time-series context.  There would be more scope to take advantage of such factors 
in cross-section work, that is, in explaining cross-country differences in the incidence of banking 
crises over long time periods.  Given however the difficulties encountered so far in predicting 
banking crises out-of-sample, such work should be encouraged, that is, its unlikely that a model 
based almost solely on macroeconomic and liberalization variables will do the job. 
                     
     
50
  See, for example, Demirgic-kunt and Detragiache (1997) who introduce law enforcement and deposit-
insurance variables into their banking crisis model. 
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Fourth, we think the ongoing work on modelling the nature of cross-country contagion of 
crises should be extended.  One of the lessons of the last few major crises (that is, the Mexican 
peso crisis cum tequilla effect and the Asian/global financial crisis) is that the channels of cross-
country contagion are more numerous and complicated than we thought earlier.  Trade links 
(bilateral and third party), perceived similarities in macroeconomic and financial vulnerability, 
the dynamics of competitive devaluations, induced effects on primary commodity prices, 
financial links operating via withdrawal of a common bank or mutual fund lender, liquidity and 
margin-call effects operating via the regulatory framework, and perceived changes in the 
rescheduling cum capital-account convertibility regime (such as took place after the Russian 
unilateral rescheduling/default in August 1998 and the Malaysian imposition of wide-ranging 
capital controls), each seem to play a part in contagion.  We need to find ways to incorporate 
more of these channels of contagion in our forecasting models.      
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